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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Congress was to prohibit a deduction for meals and lodging in
situations like the one in question.
It is submitted that the preferable construction is that followed by
the court in Carasso and suggested by the dissenting judge in Bilder.
Using this rule under the new sections, only transportation costs
are deductible while meals and lodging are not. The probable
reason for the legislative limitation on the meal and lodging deduc-
tion was the abuse of it by taxpayers who were using the provision
as a means of obtaining "tax deductible vacations." But it cer-
tainly seems that the trips taken by the taxpayers in the two prin-
cipal cases would fall into a "necessity" category, and that the costs
incurred, while of a personal living expense nature, were "extra-
ordinary" medical expenses. Perhaps Congress did, as the majority
suggested in the Bilder case, become entangled in sweeping terms
which prohibited a deduction in cases where the trip was essential
to the health of the taxpayer. However, the language of the statutes
and of the committee reports is too strong to be subject to judicial
construction in favor of the taxpayer, and only Congress by new
legislation can correct the non-allowance of this justifiable deduction.
H. ARTHUR SANDMAN
Partnerships-Profit Sharing by Lender
Should a corporation which lends money to another corporation
be held a partner of the latter where the loan is secured, the lender
is to be repaid the principal and interest and is to share in the
borrower's profits? The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced
with this question in Minute Maid Corp. v. United Foods, Inc.'
United Foods, a broker of frozen foods, was an authorized
direct buyer of products packaged by Minute Maid Corporation.
By receiving notice of price increases a considerable time in advance,
United Foods could realize a speculative profit on inventories in addi-
tion to substantial volume discounts and allowances if it had sufficient
financial resources to buy large quantities. United Foods, not having
sufficient funds nor normal credit sources to make such purchases,
entered into a written agreement with United States Cold Storage
Corporation. The agreement provided: (1) Cold Storage would
lend money to United Foods to purchase foods; (2) the purchased
'291 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1961).
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goods and accounts receivable from sales of these goods would be
collateral for the loans; (3) notes for the loans would be given; and
(4) a "Special Account" would be set up on the books of Cold
Storage and managed by it. The "Special Account" would be
debited for all the warehouse charges and credited with all discounts
and allowances made by Minute Maid and any profits realized by
United Foods on the sale of goods bought with the borrowed money.
At the end of the year the "Special Account" would be closed, and
any profits or losses would be divided.'
During the life of this agreement United Foods became heavily
indebted to Minute Maid for food purchases. Minute Maid sought
to recover from Cold Storage on the ground that the contract consti-
tuted a partnership under the law of Texas, but the district court
held that no partnership existed. On appeal the court of appeals
reversed.
The court considered two major points in concluding that a
partnership existed by virtue of the written agreement. First, the
court found that under the Texas definition of a partnership' a com-
mon business existed by virtue of the arrangement whereby Cold
Storage was to furnish the financing and warehouse facilities and
United Foods was to make use of its position as a direct buyer of
Minute Maid products. Cold Storage contended that the agreement
created only a debtor-creditor relationship. The court readily ad-
mitted that such a relationship existed between the two corporations,
but termed this "indecisive." 4
It is undoubtedly true that one may be both a lender and a part-
At-the end of seven months the contract was terminated, the "Special
Account" dosed, and a profit of twenty-two thousand dollars was divided
between the parties.
' "We take it, therefore, to be the law of Texas that if the parties entered
into a contract from which it is clear that the parties contemplated joining
in a common business for their common benefit to be operated for their joint
account and in which they as owners each of an interest would be entitled
to share as principals in the profits as such, they would be partners." 291
F.2d at 583.
- Although Texas had adopted the Uniform Partnership Act, it did not
become effective until after this case. However, the same problem which
'faced the court could also arise under the act since its definition of a part-
nership is essentially the same as that given by the court. For a discussion
.of the act, see Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L.J. 617(1915); Sher & Bromberg, Texas Partnership Law in the 20th Century-
3;hy Texas ShQuld Adopt the Uniform Partnership Act, 12 Sw. L.J. 263(1958).
'291 F.2d at 583.
(Vol. 40
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ner at the same time.' The court therefore was correct in holding
that the debtor-creditor relationship was not the sole factor to be
considered. However, according to past Texas cases, the existence
of a debtor and creditor relationship is a very important factor in
finding that no partnership exists.'
Secondly, from the fact that Cold Storage had the right to accept
or reject proposed collateral for loans and the fact that the parties
might agree on the volume of goods to be purchased on notice of any
price increases, the court found that joint control existed. The court
supported its conclusion by referring to the testimony of an officer of
United Foods that Cold Storage could have stepped in and "written
United off." However, rather than showing the existence of joint
control, this statement would seem to indicate that Cold Storage had
a form of veto power. It has been held that possession of a veto
power by the lender is not sufficient alone to constitute the lender a
partner with his borrower.7
No definite rule can be drawn from the cases as to how much
control must be possessed by a lender before he will be held a partner
since this is a matter of degree, but the cases do provide a basis for
examples and for some generalization. A partnership was found
not to exist where the lender received a share of the profits and (1)
had his agent in control of the books and management of the busi-
ness, received a mortgage on all the financed goods and received all
the proceeds from sales;' (2) held -the right to veto speculative
ventures of the borrower;9 (3) required that all the borrower's
property be placed in trust for him until the loan was repaid ;1o (4)
received liens on the borrowers' crops and tools and could prohibit
'See, e.g., Nye v. United States, 84 F.2d 457 (1st Cir. 1936); De
Martini v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 90 Cal. App. 2d 139, 202 P.2d 828
(Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
'Davis v. Gilmore, 244 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Dunn v.
Hankins, 127 S.W.2d 983 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Cosner v. Weller, 109
S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Eddingston v. Acorn, 259 S.W. 948
(Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
"Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 158 N.E. 77 (1927).8Dubos v. Jones, 34 Fla. 539, 16 So. 392 (1894). The court termed
the controls security measures which did not alter the relationship of debtor
and creditor. However, it should be noted that this case appears to be
inconsistent with the weight of authority.
" Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 158 N.E. 77 (1927). The court re-
ferred to this power as a measure of ordinary caution.
"l It re Mission Farms Dairy, 56 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1932).
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the borrowers from pooling their resources;" (5) could cause
liquidation of the borrower's business. 2
A partnership was held to exist where the lender shared in the
profits and (1) made no provision in the agreement for repayment
of the advances, but provided for the lender's agent to manage the
borrower's business and to receive and sell all the manufactured
products ;3 (2) the lender had complete authority to dispose of the
business output, and the products bore the lender's label;14 (3) the
lender kept the books and signed the checks;" (4) the lender
assumed complete control of the business ;1 (5) the lender paid the
borrower's bills.' In these cases it was felt that the control went
beyond ordinary security measures and entered into the realm of
complete takeover or management of the business, either with the
borrower or to the latter's exclusion.
It would seem that the controls in the principal case amounted to
nothing more than security measures. When compared with the
above cases which found that a partnership existed, the controls in
the principal case are not nearly as extensive. It is submitted that
the decision of the principal case is against the weight of authority.
Where a creditor exercises controls which in form and substance are
nothing more than protective measures for his loan, no partnership
should be held to exist in the absence of estoppel or a clear intent
to become partners.'8
T. LAFONTINE ODOM
"Eddingston v. Acorn, 259 S.W. 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
'McGurk v. Moore, 234 N.C. 248, 67 S.E.2d 53 (1951).
San Joaquin Light & Power Corp. v. Costaloupes, 96 Cal. App. 322, 274
Pac. 84 (Dist. Ct. App. 1929).
"Southern Can Co. v. Hartlove, 152 Md. 303, 136 At. 624 (1927).
15 Collyer v. Egbert, 200 Wash. 342, 93 P.2d 399 (1939).
' Hudson Letter Co. v. Racette, 244 Mich. 144, 221 N.W. 151 (1928).
Causey v. Cottman Co., 12 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1926).
's One of the reasons suggested by the dissenting judge for not finding a
partnership was that intent to create a partnership is an essential element
of partnership. However, he stated that it is the manifested intent and not
the secret subjective intent which is controlling. He found no evidence of
an intent to create a partnership here. 291 F.2d at 585.
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